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Abstract
In research on risk and hazard, three central questions seem to persist: What should 
people and societies worry about? Why do people live and work in areas subject 
to repeated hazards? How is it that they survive and even prosper in such areas? 
Les Heathcote and I were part of an early effort to address these questions globally 
across the range of natural hazards. working together on a study that contrasted the 
agricultural drought hazard in Australia with that of Tanzania. From our comparison 
and other national studies, we learned that developing countries had much greater 
hazard deaths rates and industrialized countries had much larger economic losses. 
Adding in the costs of adaptation effort to prevent these losses gave us an overall 
social cost, and as the percentage of per capita GNP current at the time, the burden 
on the developing countries was much greater than that of the industrialized 
countries.
Now forty years later, human-induced climate change that we did not consider in our 
original study, will almost surely bring more drought to some areas, more floods to 
others, and possibly more and greater cyclones. In this paper I examine global trends 
and causes of extreme climatological, weather, and disaster events, since our original 
study. These events are growing and have multiple causes of growing population, and 
economic wealth, as well as weather and climate. I then consider trends in adaptation 
especially as it is addressed to climate change. For a conclusion, I briefly reconsider 
the persistent questions.
In looking back over my half century of research on risk and hazard (Kates 2001), 
three central questions seem to persist: What should people and societies worry 
about? Why do people live and work in areas subject to repeated hazards? How is it 
that they survive and even prosper in such areas? 
Agricultural drought in Australia and Tanzania
Les Heathcote and I were part of an early effort to address these questions 
globally across the range of natural hazards using the network of the International 
Geographical Union (IGU). The network undertook standard studies of 10 different 
natural hazards at 40 sites in 17 countries (White 1974) and in depth national studies 
of droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones that contrasted an industrialized and 
developing country (Burton et al. 1978). 
The drought study contrasted the agricultural drought hazard in Australia with that 
of Tanzania. I came to Adelaide in 1971 to work together with Les on it. We tried to 
measure the then current losses from agricultural drought using measures of deaths 
from the hazard and the economic value of damages (crop and livestock losses, forced 
sales, and the like). To calculate the full social costs of he hazard, we estimated the 
individual and societal cost of adaptation as the value of effort expended in trying 
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to abate or prevent these losses. To place the social cost in perspective we compared 
it with the then (1970s) gross national product. And all of these were expressed in 
comparable terms such as per capita person at risk to the hazard. (See Table 1).
In Australia, we estimated that a million people of the 13 million population were at 
risk, although there were no deaths clearly associated with drought. Their production 
losses averaged over the 66 years of the then available data were $24 in then current 
US$ per person. Adaptation costs by farmers included irrigation, water provision 
and conservation, replanting, excess fodder, and the like. Government expenditures 
included a share of irrigation and water provision, drought relief, emergency water 
and fodder, warning and information, and research. All told these amounted to $19 
$US roughly split between farmers and government. Thus total social costs were $43 
$US per person at risk, yet amounted to only 0.10% of per capita gross national 
product (GNP).
By comparison, in Tanzania deaths due to agricultural drought were estimated 
to average annually 40 per million of the then 12 million at risk. Damages were 
estimated at .70 $US and adaptation at .80 $US per person at risk, with total costs of 
agricultural drought at $1.50 $US per person at risk and equivalent to 1.8% of per 
capita GNP. The costs of adaptation fell mainly on farm households with 10 days per 
year for labor invested in reducing possible drought losses. Government expenditures 
were for research; irrigation, and rural water-supply development; famine relief, food 
import and storage; and provision for migrants. 
From our comparison and the other national studies (Table 1), we learned three 
important things. Hazard losses varied greatly between the industrialized (Australia, 
US) and developing (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tanzania) countries using the two basic 
measures. Developing countries had much larger death rates expressed as the annual 
average number of deaths (per million at risk), and industrialized countries had much
Table 1: Comparative Natural Hazard Costs* in 1970s
Hazards Countries
Deaths
/106 
people
Damage 
/person 
at risk
Adaptation 
/person at 
risk
Social 
Costs/
person 
at risk
Cost 
% 
GNP
Agricultural 
Drought
Tanzania 40 .70 .80 1.50 1.84
Australia 0 24.00 19.00 43.00 .10
Flood Sri Lanka 5 13.40 1.60 15.00 2.13
US 2 40.00 8.00 48.00 .11
Tropical 
Cyclone
Bangladesh 3000 3.00 .40 3.40 .73
US 2 13.30 1.20 14.50 .04
*Monetary costs are in US 1970s dollars per person at risk. (Source: Burton, Kates 
and White 1993, pp. 68–74).
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larger estimated economic losses as the value of damages sustained (per person at 
risk). When the costs of adaptation effort expended to prevent these losses were added 
in to calculate an overall social costs, these total costs were considerably greater than 
the losses. But when the social costs were compared as the percentage of per capita 
GNP current at the time, the burden on the developing countries was much greater 
than that of the industrialized countries.
Now forty years later, human-induced climate change that we did not consider in our 
original study will almost surely bring more drought to some areas, more floods to 
others, and possibly more and greater cyclones. In this paper I examine global trends 
in extreme climatological and weather events and disasters since our original study. I 
then consider trends in adaptation especially as it is addressed to climate change. For 
a conclusion, I revisit the three persistent questions
Trends in Events and Disasters
At least two series of global observations of extreme climatological and weather events 
that resulted in disasters are maintained by the large reinsurance corporations. The 
series of natural disasters of the Swiss Reinsurance Company (2011) as defined by 
either economic losses and/or casualties covers the period 1970–2010. Over that 
time natural disasters rose more than five-fold (see Table 2 and Fig.1). In the series 
maintained for a shorter period (1980–2010) by the Munich Reinsurance Company 
(2011), weather catastrophes rose threefold.
Using the longer series of Swiss Reinsurance that parallels my own work with Les, one 
would expect rising disasters or catastrophes from the combined effects of increasing 
populations and property at risks. In Table 2 the five-fold global rise in disasters 
(mostly weather and climate related) are compared to an almost two-fold increase in 
global population and a four and a half-fold increase in global wealth as measured by 
economic product. Is there also a possible role of climate change in explaining the 
increase in extreme events and disasters?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as it prepares for its fifth 
assessment commissioned a Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and 
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) As this paper is being
Table 2: Natural Catastrophes, World Population, Gross World Product, 1970–
2010, 1970=100
Years 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Natural 
Catastrophes 100 134 359 406 521
Population 100 121 143 162 186
Gross World 
Product 100 155 237 339 449
Sources: Catastrophes: Swiss Reinsurance (2011); Population and Gross World 
Product: DeLong (1998) and update to 2010.
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Fig. 1: Number of natural catastrophes, 1970–2010
Source: Swiss Reinsurance 2011
written, the Summary for Policy Makers is available (IPCC, 2012), and the full text 
will be shortly available. I have ranked, by the reliability of the science, the major 
findings as to the role of climate change in altering the characteristics of climate-
related extreme events and disasters. They are: in the words of the Report’s fact sheet:
Changing extreme events
—Observations since 1950 show changes in some extreme events, particularly 
daily temperature extremes, and heat waves.
—It is virtually certain that increases in the frequency of warm daily temperature 
extremes and decreases in cold extremes will occur throughout the 21st century 
on a global scale. 
—It is very likely that heat waves will increase in length, frequency, and/or  
intensity over most land areas.
—It is very likely that average sea level rise will contribute to upward trends in 
extreme sea levels and in extreme coastal high water levels.
—It is likely that the frequency of heavy precipitation will increase in the 21st 
century over many regions.
—It is likely that the average maximum wind speed of tropical cyclones (also 
known as typhoons or hurricanes) will increase throughout the coming century, 
although possibly not in every ocean basin. However it is also likely there will be 
either a decrease or essentially no change in the number of tropical cyclones.
—There is … medium confidence, that droughts will intensify over the
coming century in southern Europe and the Mediterranean region, central 
Europe, central North America, Central America and Mexico, northeast Brazil, 
and southern Africa. 
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—Projected precipitation and temperature changes imply changes in floods, 
although overall there is low confidence at the global scale regarding climate-
driven changes in magnitude or frequency of river related flooding, due to limited 
evidence and because the causes of regional changes are complex.
Thus climate change has already brought us more heat almost everywhere. In my own 
home region of New England, in the northeast of the U.S., the growing season has 
already increased by a week and there has been a marked increase in intense 24 hour 
rainfalls. But the cautious language of the IPCC report (too cautious for some) serves 
to remind us that recent increases in extreme climate events and disasters or any 
specific event cannot be simply attributed to climate change.
A recent analysis of major disastrous events in Australia, bushfires from 1925–2009, 
helps illustrate the point. The 2009 Black Saturday fires in Victoria with its disastrous 
loss of life (173 deaths) and property (2298 buildings) were the largest in absolute 
numbers since 1925. The fires coincided with very high temperatures and an ongoing 
drought and many wondered whether they were influenced by human-induced 
global warming. But as shown in Table 2, population and wealth also increase 
over time and historic fire disasters should be considered in the context of current 
population and wealth. Thus Compton et. al. (2010) reconstructed a set of wildfire 
building and population losses from 1925, normalized (so-called) by inflating past 
losses proportionate to the 2008/09 building stock and population. By this revision, 
the 2009 fires were no longer the largest, but fourth in terms of building damage 
and second in terms of loss of life. A climate link was found with natural climate 
variations, the El Nino–Southern Oscillations and Indian Ocean dipole phenomena, 
but not with greenhouse gasses or global temperature.
Even in the midst of extreme events, there is much uncertainty as to their cause or 
their linkage to climate change. In one study of 24 Australian wheat farmers (Head 
et al. 2011) during the two failed harvest seasons of 2006–2008, the then current 
drought was perceived as not the normal, one in seven years, but one more extreme 
and frequent. Yet, there was much uncertainty that it could be attributed to climate 
change, even among the majority who clearly believed in climate change.
In considering the trends and distribution of disaster losses of the world some forty 
years later, the SREX Report echoes our findings of 1970:
Trends in disaster losses
—Economic losses from weather- and climate-related disasters vary from year to 
year and place to place, but overall have increased .
—Total economic losses from natural disasters are higher in developed countries.
—Economic losses expressed as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
are higher in developing countries .
—Deaths from natural disasters occur much more in developing countries. From 
1970 to 2008 for example, more than 95% of deaths from natural disasters were 
in developing countries.
—Economic losses from weather- and climate-related disasters have been heavily 
influenced by increasing exposure of people and economic assets.
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With a focus on extreme weather and climate events, the SREX study did not 
examine extensively the real world situation of the multiple stresses that face people 
and places impacted by climate change. To explain the causes of disastrous losses, 
weather and climate events are not solely responsible, but combine with other sources 
of stress. For example, in the study of New South Wales wheat farmers (Head et al., 
2011) farm households struggled not only with major droughts, but also with new 
deregulated marketing arrangements, and new financial risks. A wine growers and 
producers study (Park et al. 2012) found growers and producers, at the time of the 
study, not only responding to warmer temperatures and heat stress, but to the global 
financial crisis, a global oversupply of grapes, changes in consumer preferences, 
increases in energy costs, and shortages of irrigation water.
Trends in adaptation in times of climate change
People who live and work in high hazard areas survive and even prosper because of 
their adaptations that lessen the hazard exposure or sensitivity of their household 
or workplace. In the 1970s, these adaptations were originally called adjustments 
following Gilbert White’s use of the term and the desire to distinguish these from 
biophysical adaptations in evolutionary science. 
First propounded some 70 years ago and published in what might have been the 
most influential dissertation in geography, White (1945) defined adjustment as … 
‘the human process of occupying or living in an area and the transformations of the 
initial landscape which result.’ Never comfortable with abstractions, White went on 
to specify at least eight forms of human adjustment to floods: elevating land, abating 
floods by land treatment, protecting against floods by levees and dams, providing 
emergency warning and evacuation, making structural changes in buildings and 
transportation, changing land use to reduce vulnerability, distributing relief, and 
taking out insurance. 
Over time the distinction between adjustment and adaptation was not maintained 
and adaptation as well as adjustment became enshrined in the literature and now in 
the international agreements intended to reduce the dangers of climate change. The 
glossary of the SREX report (IPCC 2012) describes adaptation in human systems 
as ‘the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to 
moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.’
Although adaptation has always been recognized as a needed response to climate 
change, most of the effort to respond to climate change has emphasized ‘mitigation’  
– the effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to remove them from the 
atmosphere. Indeed a hostility or skepticism to adaptation was evident for many 
years, fueled by a concern by advocates of strong action to counter climate change 
that adaptation was being offered as a way to live with climate change rather than 
prevent or diminish it. But as it has become apparent that human-induced climate 
change was occurring, and despite mitigation efforts will increase, interest in 
adaptation has grown (Pielke et al. 2007).
There is already much talk about adaptation but little action. A recent professional 
literature survey found 1741 documents related to climate change adaptation 
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published between 2006–9 (Berrang-Ford et al. 2011), Yet despite this outpouring 
of studies, only 87 (5%) reported on actual adaptations and most of these involved 
planning for adaptation rather than specific adaptations to cope with climate change 
impacts. Much talk but little adaptation is also suggested by an Australian survey.
A baseline study (Gardner et al. 2010) was undertaken by the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) in 2008–9 to measure the 
type and extent of adaptation activities among 242 organizations, half of whom were 
business groups or industry representatives in 12 affected sectors and half were state 
and local government groups, infrastructure management organizations, associations, 
and non-governmental organizations. Some 40% of the responding groups said 
they had undertaken adaptation activities but these are characterized in the report as 
planning activities and no specific adaptations beyond planning or information are 
listed.
Across the range of climate impacts, there are many potential adaptations, but most 
of these are incremental, doing slightly more of what is already being done to deal 
with natural variation in weather and climate. One of the most extensive listings 
of adaptations to specific climate impacts is that of the U.S. National Research 
Council’s Panel on Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change (NRC 2010) which 
lists 314 adaptations in seven different sectors. In reviewing these, I found only 16 
(5%) appear not to be incremental in that they had not been tried, at least locally, 
somewhere in the U.S. 
Incremental adaptation in the short-run may also be maladaptive in the long run. 
In hazard research (Burton, Kates, and White 1993; Kates et al. 2007), we labeled 
this behavior as the levee or catastrophe effect. Incremental adjustments and routine 
responses, such as building levees along a river or suppressing forest fires had the 
effect of reducing frequent, low to moderate magnitude losses, and thus increase the 
short-term land and resource value. Eventually, though, the forest is burned or the 
levee is over-topped, and human development, enticed into the hazard zone by the 
apparent success of protection, is catastrophically lost. 
Incremental adaptations will also be insufficient as climate change grows, and will 
require transformational adaptation to climate change impacts. This will be most 
likely where vulnerability in certain regions, populations, or resource systems is 
currently high and/or if more severe climate change occurs beyond the likely range 
of current assessments. Vulnerability may already be high because of physical settings 
such as the Arctic where the rate of warming is high or in low lying coasts, deltas, 
and islands. Vulnerable groups include marginally productive livelihoods, poor or 
indigenous peoples, and the major victims of extreme events, the very young, the 
elderly, and women generally. The combination of climate change and economic 
decline or existing poverty can be severe as in the low-lying deltas of Bangladesh, seen 
by many as the most vulnerable place on earth to climate change. 
There are least three sources of severe climate change that can require 
transformational adaptation. These are changes that go beyond the range of current 
assessments given the large fossil fuel reserves , the weak international agreements on 
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greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions (Moss et al. 2010), and the inability of science to 
constrain the upper bounds of warming for a given greenhouse forcing (Schneider 
2009). Then there are local ‘hot spots’ or even large regions such as the Arctic where 
global change is amplified ( NOAA 2011) Also, there are possible tipping points that 
could cause rapid climate change impacts in certain regions or even globally (Lenton 
et al. 2008). All of these leave open a small but significant probability of quite large 
and perhaps abrupt climate change as anthropogenic forcing grows. The ‘4 Degrees 
and Beyond’, conference in 2009 was the first to consider how human environmental 
systems would respond to global warming beyond the range of current assessments 
(New et al. 2011).
Given a need to go beyond incremental adaptations, what might such adaptations 
be? We describe these as transformational adaptations (Kates, Travis and Wilbanks 
2012) and they can be either responsive, taking place during and after serious climate 
change impacts, or anticipatory, in advance of threats that pose serious risks. Many 
transformative adaptations are technological, infrastructural, or process changes., 
Others are behavioral, affecting how individuals and society make decisions and 
allocate resources to cope with climate change. Or they may include fundamental 
changes in institutional arrangements, priorities, and norms. 
We envision at least three types of transformative adaptations: those that are 
adopted at a much larger scale or intensity, those that are truly novel for a specific 
region or resource system, and those that shift locations or transform places. The 
leading example of the enlargement of scale and intensity is that of the Netherlands 
(Deltacommissie 2008), in its current programs of coastal defense (‘Weak Links’) 
and riverine flood abatement and water supply (‘Room for the River’) .These 
are transformational because of their enlarged scale, intensity and integrated 
combinations of adaptations, novel approaches (artificial islands), evacuation of some 
areas (depolderization), as well as new institutions and funding mechanisms. 
An example of a novel adaptation is the effort to create water efficient maize for 
eastern Africa (African Agriculture Technology Foundation 2009). Efforts to breed 
drought-resistant maize plants in East Africa are not new; the novelty of this effort 
lies in the use of new breeding techniques (both conventional and biotechnological), 
a package of best agronomic practices with cost-free distribution to farmers over 25 
years, and the unique public private partnership (International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center, the Monsanto Corporation, five National Agricultural Research 
systems, and the Gates and Buffet Foundations). 
Some adaptations collectively transform places or shift such systems to other 
locations. Resettlement associated with climate variability, and, by some accounts, 
climate change per se, is beginning in a few places (de Sherbenin et al. 2011) 
including Arctic villages (US ACE 2010, Ford et al. 2010) and Pacific islands 
(Burkett 2011). Anticipating future evacuation, one Australian aid project is currently 
preparing islanders for livelihoods in Australia (Reed 2011). Other transformative 
shifts are underway in Australia as for example, wine growers and producers purchase 
Tasmanian properties to diversify their holdings to cooler areas (Park et al. 2012).
South Australian Geographical Journal, vol.111, 2012         51
Persistent questions, persistent answers
In the 70 years of modern geographic research on hazards, three central questions 
have persisted: What should people and societies worry about? Why do people live 
and work in areas subject to repeated hazards? How is it that they survive and even 
prosper in such areas?
What should people and societies worry about?
When Les and I worked together as part of the IGU study, we assumed that natural 
hazards were important enough to collectively worry about them. We did so in part 
because of our place-based studies in which we came to both respect and worry 
about those who lived and worked in hazard prone areas. But also because we were 
interested in the relationship between nature and society. One way to study that 
relationship is to study the extremes of those resources or services most essential for 
human sustenance and those hazards that most threaten human life and livelihood. 
This strategy persists to this day and on the resource side has had a major revival with 
the concentration of study over the last decade on ecosystem services (Daily et al. 
2000).
One way of addressing what to worry about was to sum up the trends in natural 
hazards losses and gains up to 1973. Thus I helped write:
To sum up, the global toll of natural disasters rises at least as fast as the increase of 
population and material wealth, and probably faster. In developing countries, disasters 
may be less frequent but are more catastrophic and more costly in lives. (Burton, Kates 
and White 1978, p. 2).
Today, with the hindsight of four decades, I would add some additional observations. 
Many kinds of losses are still uncounted and the net benefits of locations and land 
use subject to hazard events are rarely measured. It is also rare that climate alone can 
cause disasters as we increasingly recognize the multiple stresses that contribute to 
disaster loss.
While loss of life from natural hazards is still large it is has declined rapidly in the 
industrialized world (despite the Japanese tsunami) as well as in the developing world 
(albeit more slowly and despite the enormous loss from the Haitian earthquake). 
Losses of life have declined much more on a relative scale when growth in population 
is taken into account and when non-climate disasters (earthquakes) are excluded. 
Finally, the assumption that the number of extreme events averaged over decades was 
essentially stationary has come into question given human-induced climate change 
and some extreme events are actually rising. Climate change increases the number 
and intensity of extreme weather and climatic events, the people and places exposed 
to them, and their sensitivity to these events.
Why do people live and work in areas subject to repeated hazards?
In my own dissertation (Kates 1962), I asked this question of residents and users of a 
small flood plain in LaFollette, Tennessee, U.S. I knew that people live and work in 
flood plains for a variety of locational reasons including certain intrinsic advantages to 
flood plain location. But why do people persist in living and working in areas subject 
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to repeated flood? After conducting extensive interviews, I learned more of why 
flood plain users or residents did not seem unduly concerned about floods despite 
the opinions of technical personnel or even repeated flood experience. They had a 
variety of personal perceptions of hazard and potential loss that somewhat rationally 
lead them to ignore flood hazard. There perceptions ranged from simple ignorance to 
various expectations that they would not experience a future flood or bear a serious 
loss. Les had similar observations for agricultural drought as did the authors of the 
recent fine-grained study of wheat farmers (Head et al. 2011).
 
But beyond such individual differences, is there a larger, common, explanation for 
living in recurrent hazardous areas? One of our earliest insights was in the relationship 
between hazards and resources. People encounter hazard, we thought, in the search 
for the useful. For example, places that provide easy access to several different 
ecosystems or resource locations are often sites of high natural hazard – earthquakes 
where mountains meet the sea, coastal storms at land’s end, floodplains with fertile 
soils and easy access, and drought where dry lands border the damp.
How is it that they survive and even prosper in such areas?
People who live and work in high hazard areas do so through a huge number 
of adaptations that allow them to reduce their hazard exposure, diminish their 
sensitivity, and increase their capacity to undertake adaptations. These have always 
been a mix of individual and collective actions. For example, farmers dealing with 
agricultural drought have always required the collective and anticipatory adaptations 
that improved their crops and cropping practices, created storage, provided 
irrigation, or roads for marketing . But the need for collective, anticipatory, and 
transformational adaptations will only increase with climate change. New research on 
transformational adaptation should enter our geographic priorities as it already seems 
to have done so in Australia. In our recent U.S. National Research Council study 
on adaptation, we made a special effort to be briefed on Australian experience and 
research which we considered exemplary. We were not disappointed.
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